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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
MARILYN K. MANNING)

Plaintiff and

App~llant 1

vs.
WESTERN AIRLINES~ a corporation~
and CONNECTICUT GENERAL
LlFE INSURANCE COMPANY~ a

I
Case
No~ 9109

corporation~

Defendants and ReJpondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEivlENT OF FACTS
Res pon J en ts consider a ppe lla nt, s sta temen t of facts to
be inadequate and misleading. Accordingly~ it .is contraverted
generally~ and

the folJowing statement is submitted.

Appellant 'vas pl~intiff below. She is the Vilidov..T of Arthur
~l. Manning. She also i~ the de signa ted beneficiary of the
decedent to the extent o £ his par tici pa tion in three group
insu ranee plans in effect betv..recn respondents, d ef en dan ts
below: ( l) Group Life Insurance; ( 2) Group Accident and

s
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Sickness Insurance; and (3) Group Hospital anJ Surgical
Expense Benefits~ with a Family Benefit Option (Ex. D-1,
D-3, D-9, P-6).

By her complaint, appellant sought recovery against both
respondent insurance company, hereinafter ca Ued ~ 'Connecti.
cut·:>, and res pond en t air line, hereinafter called 'Western'',
4

decedenf.s employer, of $3,600.00 under such Group Life
Insurance and of $ _:;~600. 00 under such Group Accident and

...

Sickness Insurance; Group Hospital and Surgical .Expense
Benefits were not claimed (R. 1-2) . Respondents answered:
( 1 ) denying a right of recovery under .such Group Life Insu r•
ance in that decedent~ s coverage had been cancelJ ed prior to~

and was not in effect at~ his death; ( 2) denying a right of
recovery under such Group Accident and Sickness Insurance
in that such coverage did not provide for the payment of
benefits for losses due to injuries arising out of~ or in the course
of, any employment for wage or profit~ and (3) deny.ng~ in
any event a right of recovery against Western (R. 3-'5).
In the discovery period~ a ppell ant admitted that the death
of Arthur M. Manning resulted from an accident ~vhich
occurred in the course of his employment for ~vage or profit
( R. 1 7, 12) . At pre- trial con f erente respondents in trod uc ed
Group Accident and Sickness Insurance Certificate 8818, issued
to decedent and containing the following exclusion: " . . .
provided~ how ever, that this in sur a nee shall not cover 1osses
due to injuries arising out of> or in the course of, any employ·
ment for \vage or profit" (Ex. D-3, p. 2) and the basic policy
containing an equivalent clause (Ex. P -4, page 2) ~ By pretrial admission~ although apparently id~ntifying the \\-Tong

6
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policy, a p pe llan t cone eded the ex is tenc e of such exclusion
(R. 1St 37); in any event) no evidence denying its applicability
\vas introduced. Accordingly): the pre-trial judge granted
respondentst tnotion to dismiss that portion of appellanfs
complaint relative to recovery of $3~600.00 under the Group
Accident and Sickness Insu ranee ( R. 38) . Such dismissal was
not disputed at trial and was incorporated in the final judgment
of the trial court (R~ 78). There thus remained for resolution

a.t trial the question of ~vhcther appellant \vas entitled to
recover $.),600.00 from respondents as decedent's designated
beneficiary under the Gl'oup Life Insurance PJan (R. 38). The
case \\·as set for jury trial pursuant to appellant's demand
(R. 36, 38).
At the cotnme nce1nen t of the trial hearing~ the court stated:
"The case was set this morning for jury trial, and I can:>t see
a single fact in dispute" (R. 39). During the course of the
proceedings, the trial judge sought stipulations of fact (R.

59-63) , rejecting such of respondents' evidence as v,ras not
stipulated to or acquiesced in by appellant (R~ 56). On the
second day of triat the court said:
~
~ if after I hear this
take the matter from the jury, if
evidence I am going to
it is going to be of such a nature that reasonable minds couldn't
disagree, I didntt want to call a jury .. ~ ~-~ (R+ 65-66) +Following
jntroduction of evidence, stipulation of fact by respective
counsel and an offer of proof by counsel for appellant (R. 6768), the trial court ruJ ed that there was no 1naterial of fact
and ordered that the appellant's complaint be dismissed (R.
!t

+

•

••

78).
The following are the undisputed facts:
7
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( 1) On March 18, 1930~ respondents entered into a Group
Life Insurance Polley \Vhich~ as amended) was effective at
all times relevant to this action (Ex. D-9) . It provided that
insurance rates might be changed from time to time (Ex. D-9;
R. 51-52)~ It also provided, as did the pertinent employeets
certificate~ that when a particular em ploy ee cancelled his payroll
deduction order~ the coverage of such employee should cease
at the end of the period for which the last deduction has been
made (Ex+ P-6~ D-9).

·

(2) On A-fay 21, 1957, decedent was employed by Western
(Ex~

D-1).
( 3) On May 22, 195 7, decedent wa.s interviewed by the

personnel division of \X/ estern. At that time he was in£onned of
the Group Insurance Plans available to Western employees,

and ¥t·as handed an untilled application blank (Ex~ D-8~ D-9;
R+ 54-55) . He Vitas also given~ as a part of the program of
advising him of such plans, a booklet summarizing them ( App.

Brf. p. 2; Ex. P-2) .

It is unknown \vhether he received a

supplement to the book Iet ( R~ 60) . It is inaccurate to state

that such booklet was prep a red and published as a joint cff ort
on the part of respondents ( Ap p. Brf ~ p. 2) ; the sole evidence
on the matter was the answers of respondents (R. 27~ 3.-f)
to appellanfs written interrogatories (R. 23-24, 30-31). They
indicated that such booklet, although checked as to f onnat by

an official of Western, was prepared and published by Con·
necticut~

( 4) Decedent did not execute the application for the
group plans on l\-1ay 22t 1957 (Ex. D-8; R. 54-55). On May
2 5, however, he did so~ applying for coverage under eacb
8
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a vaj lable plan~ including Group Life Insurance (Ex. D-1) .
Such cover age was extended.

( 5) l}nder date of June .·!) 19 57 d€cedent transmitted to
7

E. H.

BroVJt·n~

Personnel Director of Western (Ex.

D~ 7) ~

a

document \vhich respondents chose to denominate and the

trial court interpreted to be, a npayroll deduction cancellation
request'' but 'vhich appclJant chooses to call an inquiry ( App.
Brf-~

p. 3) ~ Respondents object to argumentative labeJJing

in a recitation of facts on appeal; the important fact is that
the communication which \Vas f or\varded read: n I v.dsh to drop

the life insurance part of my policy if possible. Thank you, /s/
Arthur M. Manning'~ (Ex. D-7, R. 7,.1-75).
( 6) As of the close of the month of June~ 19 57~ Western
notified Connecticut of the cance lla tlo n of decedent's group
life insurance coverage (Ex. D-1, Dr 10, D-11; R.
Thereafter~ no deduction for

55- 56).

group life insurance was made

from the pay of decedent (Ex. D-5), and no premium was paid

by Western

to Connecticut

for such coverage (Ex. D-1 0; R. 55).

Respondents make parti(ular

objection to the

second

paragraph of a p pe llan f s statement of facts \\·' hich deals

\V

ith

the cost of such group insurance to the employee and the

deductions \vhich \vere made therefrom ( App. Rrf. p. 2) The
only possible rei eva nee that these facts would have VlO u 1d be
T

to ~hov.r (a) that as the amount deducted from decedent's pay·
check for ins u ranee a£ ter receipt of decedent's rcq ues t to
cancel hjs policy \vas $1.80 less ( $ L1.70 as opposed to ill3.50),
and as the amount of the life insurance premium set forth .ln
the booklet \vas S ·1.80, this is corroborative of the fact that
Western did actually cancel J\1anningts life insurance coverage

9
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(a fact whjch is undisputed in any event [Ex. D~ l D-1 0,
D-11; R. 55-56]); (b) that appellant by receipt of these payroll
deduction stubs \Vas thereby notified that his request to ca.nce1
had been honored; and (c) that for some rea5on the booklet~
given to employees explaining the various group policies of
the company constituted an offer to.insure forever the employeerecipient of the booklet~ at the rate set forth in the booklet
t

furnished~

The first two points are only of material assistance to
respondents~

appellants~

The latter paint, although argued
by appellant below~ is now abandoned and need not be considered) as appellant states that ~1.there is one basic is5ue to
be decided by this appealt' (App+ Brf., p. 6) which is whether
the life insurance policy had been cancelled.
not

The only complicating factor as to deductions \vas that
on December 1~ 1956~ the amounts deductible from employee's
pay £or certain of the group coverages (not including Iif e
ins ur a nee) were increased ( R. 56·57) . Th ust of course, that
portion of the old booklet which set forth rates (Ex. P-2) would
not be applicable after December 1~ 195 6.. The undisputed
evidence ~·as that for a period after December 1st Western
continued to hand its new employees the old booklet~ together
Vt ith a mimeographed supplement showing the rate change.s~
and that in :tVlay of 1957 (the month in which Manning ·wa5
hired) a new booklet was printed showing the new rates.
Western's employee who interviewed Manning can only testify
7

as to the above general procedure and that she did give ~-1 anning
a

booklet (R. 60) .
It is not unreasonable to assume that Manning either
10
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received the old booklet with the mimeographed supplement
or the new booklet because this would be consistent with

general company policy. But, of course, it is. completely immaterial what Mrs. Manning said her hu.sband received since
she w .as not present at the time. Certainly it is compl etel y
unfair to p.ssert, as appellant does, that .. deductions were being
taken on the basis of a new sched uie which the evidence
would show had never been given to decedent and of Vt-Thich
he was not a~rare" (App. Brf. p. 2). Respondents contend
that the \v ho1e issue is immaterial and i r rei evant in any event.
Both the old and new pamphlets showed a life insurance deduction of $1.80 per month (Ex. Pw2, R. 11). It is undisputed
that appellant received toe payroJl de4uction vouchers showing
a reduction of $1.80 in his total insurance payments (Ex. DwS).
Which ever booklet decedent received thus makes no difference.
Responden'b·also object¥ to appellanfs references to conversations between the decedent and his wife ( eTg., App.

Brf.l p. 3-4). What the decedent said to his wife about these
matters is irrelevant, immaterial and inadmissable as the
purest type of hearsay (R. 68-69) . How ever~ as respondent.,..
will show in this brief~ as a matter of law it makes no difference
for purposes of reso 1ving this case what w· as sa.id between the
decedent and his vrife.

ARGUl\1ENT

I
THIS CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE CANCELLATIOK
OF A POLICY; JT CONCERNS COVERAGE OF AN EMPLOYF.E~

11
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AppeUant's. brief argues in terms of whether or not • the
life insurance policy had been cance11edt' ( App. Brf.~ p. 6).
Such ph ras eo 1ogy is unfortunate~ beeau se inaccurate. The only
pol icy here involved (Ex. D-9) ~Tas between Western and
Connecticut and was in effect at all times here pe rtin cnt. As
is stated in 2 9 Am. Ju r ., l nsUfanc e § 13 72 :
4

~tit

is genera1ly held that an employee's contract of
insurance under the group plan consists of the policy
issued by the insurer to the employer; the individual
certificate delivered by the employer to the employee
is no part of such con tract, but on 1y an instrument
reciting the employee·s right to protection under the
terms of the group policy so long as there is compliance
v,..~ith the conditions of the policy.~~
The quoted Ian guage squares with the ruanda te of the

Utah legislature, found at 31-23-2 (3) UCA ( 1953), which
requires that nthe policy~ the application of the employer and
the· indiv1dual applications~ if any, shalJ constitute the entire
contract between the parties . . ~ The individual certificate
. ~ . issued by the insurance company setting forth a statement
as to the insurance protection to which the individual is
en tit! ed shall not become a part of the coo tract betvieen the
parties.~.

The problem ~vhich is here involved is . whether or not
the decedent was~ at the 6me of his demise~ entitled to the
coverage afforded by such existent policy. This depends, in turn~
upon 'vhether decedenfs coverage was~ prior to his death~
terminated by virtue of his communication to \Xlestern (Ex.
D-7), Western~s consequent stoppage of group life deductions
and its notification to Connecticut of the termination of such
coverage (Ex~ D-10, D-11) ~
12
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II
THIS CASE IS GOVERNED BY PRINCIPLES OF LAW
APPLICABLE TO GROUP lNSURANCE.
Th~ inaccuracy of appellant· s designation of the

question

here involved reflects a lack of underst.andingj not shared by

the courts, of the distinctive characteristics of group insurance~
Group life insurance represents na distinct form of insur-

ance differing in many, j f not most of its aspects from the
ordinary life insurance)'' Miller v. Travelers Insurance Com·
panyj 143 Pa. Super~ 270, 17 A.2d 807 ( 1941) ~ nGroup life
insurance cliff ers from ordinary old-line Life insurance,'~ Leach
v. Metro polltan Life I nsttrance Com pany1 124 Kan~ 584~ 261
Pac. 603 ( 1927); reh. den. 125 Kan. 129~ 263 Pac. 784 ( 1928).
In this regard, it is worthy of note that the Utah legislature,
recognizing that group I ife ins u ranee possesses special charac~
teristics, has enacted separate 1egisla tion pertitien t thereto., Title
31, Chapter 23, UCA ( 1953) The following excerpt from
29 Am. Jur~ 1 Insurance, § 1371, expresses some of these distinctions:
+

group ins ur a nee con tract is peculiar in that it is
made by the insurer and the cmpJoyer or someone in
an anale go us position t ~ instead of betv!leen t];:le insurer
and the insured, as in oth cr con tracts of insurance~ thus
affecting £our parties,-the i o surer~ the e_n;.pi oyer~ the
~~The

lSc(' 31-23-1, UCA ( 1953) and 7 Encyclopaedia of tht!_ Social Sciences,
Gf oup Insurance. p. 18 2 for enumerations of those organizations!
j

business units and political entities whose position is analagous to
that of the employer. Among them are t~ade unions, consumersj cooperative societies, educational institutions:> lending inst1tutions, and

municipalities.
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insured and the beneficiary. Also, group insurance is
often times a gratuity in that the employer pays either
the whole or a part of the premium~ Group insurance
di£fers from old .1 ine life insurance~ but is similar in
many respects to \Vorkman~ s compensation insurance,
in that each is secured by the employer for the benefit
of the employee, and in that emp toyrnent is a conditiont
precedent to each to be effective~ It should be berne
in mind~ however~ that group insurance is not indemnity
ins u ranee for the benefit of the employer~ but insurance
on the life of the employee for his persrinal benefit
and the protection of thO$e depending upon him, and
1~ in addition to and distinct from workmant s com~
pensation provided for by the 1a'vs of the state.' (Am.
Ju r. footnotes eliminated; pre5en t footnote supplied.)
t

III
BY THE NATURE OF A GROUP POLICY, THE EMPLOYER, WESTERN! IS NOT LIAHLE TO APPELLANT.
The employer is not 1iab l e in a 5ui t to recover the benefits
under the policy, MaJon~s Adm~x v. Prudential insurance Con1~

panyt 291 Ky. 347, 164 S.W. 2d 328 ( 1945); Peyton r·. i\1etropolitan Life lnJurance CompanJ, 148 So. 721 (La. App~, 1933);
Galleger v. Simtnons Hardware Company1 214 Mo. App. 111,
258 S.W. 16 ( 1924); Haneline t.-'. Tufner W hlte Casket Conipan y~ 2 38 N .C+ 127 ~ 76 S.E~ 2d 372 ( 195 3) . The reasoning
of the cases is swnmarized at 8 Cou[hts Cyclopedia of lnJHrttJh:e
Law,§ 2094:
~~Since

a contract for group insu ranee is between
the employer and the insurer for the benefit of the
employee., the right of act ion by the employee or his
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beneficiary or representative is against the insurer~ and
not against the employer, between whom and the
employee there is no contract of insurance.'"'
Whether the issue is phrased in terms of cancellation (as

in appellant's brief) or of coverage (as in this

brief)~ it is

clear that appellant no~.. con tends that she is en tit 1ed to recovc r

on the master policy. That being the case~ Western is not liable

to appellant

IV
UNDER THE GROUP POLICY HERE INVOLVED,
THE RELATIONSHIP Ol WESTERN TO

DECEDENT

WAS THAT OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL+
The document of greatest importance to this case is a
communication from decedent-employee to Western., his em-

ployer (Ex. D- 7) . Jt is, therefore, requisite that their relationship be defined.

In BoJeman P. Connecticut General Life lnsufance Cotnpany, 301 U.S. 196, 57 S+ Ct~ 686, 81 L_ Ed. 1036~ 11 o A.L~R.
732 ( 1937) ~affirming 84 F.2d 701 ( 5 Cir., 1936), the United
State5 Supreme Court stated~ at 301 U.S~ 204-5:
~~When

procuring the pol icy obtaining applications
of employees] taking payroll deduction orders, reporting changes in the insured group., paying premiums and
generally in doing what ever necessary to obtain and
keep the insurance in force, employers act not as agents
of the insurer but for their employees and for themselves.·' (Citations eli rninated.)
j
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In making this s t.atement~ the Supreme Court cited the
initial judicial analysis 0£ the rel a tionshi r 0 f employee vis -a-vj J
employer under the group insurance plan~ found in Dufal v.

A1etropolitan Life Insurance Co1n pany 82 N.H. 543, A. 400.
50 A.L.R. 1276, 1282-3 ( 1927):
1

!tThe claim that the employer is the agent of the
insurer in the collection and fol"Vlarding of premiwns
is ~Tholly v..="ithout foundationr By the express terms
of the policy the company looks to the employer for
the payment of the premiums. It has no concern with
whether it collects part of them from the employee or
not. The employee is insured because he has made· ap-·
plicationj and because the employer promises to pay
the insurer the premiums. The promise to pay is for the
benefit of the employee~

it is urged tha t1 as tn e provisions as to
notice of claim~ p.roof of loss~ etc~ are contained in
the tnaster po 1icy~ th er efo re the em player is the insurer's agent to give information of these subjects. It
t

~Again~

is said that the whole purpose of the group insurance
scheme would be frustrated unless the employer cooperates with the employee as agent lby implication for
the insurer.
j

\~That

the employer is expected to cooperate with the
employee is evident~ The whole scheme is paternalistic.
The error of counsel, here and elsewhere, is in failing
to appreciate that the paternalism is that of employer
towards employee. It does not have the effect of making
e ben evo lent parent the agent of the party v.·· i th
\vhom he inaugurates a contract for the benefit of his
children. The line dividing the three parties to the
contract according to their interest and real position
in these transactions puts the employer with the employee) as opposed to the insurer. 'J

tn
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With the decision of further cases involving group insur-

ancel the vie"· that the employer acts as an agent of the

employee has become standard. 2
The fact that an em p Ioyer does not act as the agent of
the insurance carrier was recognized by this court in Ralston
l
Metropolitan Life lnJurance Compan)", 90 Utah 496:t 62
P .2d 1119 ( 19 36) . In that case~ the employee sought recovery
of total and permanent disabiJity benefits provided for by the
group life policy in effect between the insurance company and
Southern Pacific Company~ his empJoyerT One of the issues
at trial and upon appeal was whether proof of claim h.ad been
1

2

•

1 Appleman~ lnJurance Lau· r-nni Practice, § 43; 29 Am. Jur. 1 lnsur~
§ 1:)79; C.J.S., lnJurance~ · § 140; Metropolitan Life lnJtJ.rance

ance
~

Comp~ny v QuHt;·~ 92 F .2 d 829 ( 7 Cir ') 193 7) ; Connecticut General
Life Insurance C()mpany v. Speerj 18 5 Ark 615, 48 S.W. 2d 55 3
( 1932) : B!aylol:k v. Prudential insurance CrJfftpany, 84 Ga. App.
641, 67 S.E. 2d 17 3 ( 1951) ; T higpin 1!, Metropolitan Life 1nsurance
Company, 57 Ga. App. 405~ 195 S.E_ 591 ( 1938); Ldncaster v.
Travelers Insurance Com pan)', 53 Ga. App. 718, 189 S.E. 79 ( 1936);
Metropolitan Life Insurance- Company v. H enr)', 217 Ind. 33, 2:-i
N.E. 2d 918 (1940); Mnt·dles v. Equitable Life AJsurdnce Soc.f
115 Ind. App. 56\ 60 N.E. 2d 747 ( 1945); Ledth v. Meuopolitan
Life lnJurance Companyj supra; Masanj 1 Adnl x 11. Prudential Insurance Company1 supra; Equitable Life Assurance Soc. v. Hall, 2)3
Ky. 347~ 164 S.W. 2d 386 ( 1934); Kloidl ·v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Compan;·! 18 N.J. Misc. 661~ 16 A.2d 274 (1939); Penple
ex. rf!l. Kirkman v. Van Amringe, 266 N.Y. 277, 194 N.E. 754 (1935);
Rivers v. State Ca.pital Life JnJurance Company, 245 N.C. 461, 96 S.E.
ld q31, 68 A_L_R. 2d 205 (1957); Haru!line F. Turner White Casket
Companyj supra; Dewedse v. Trave-lers Insurance Conlpanyj 208 N.C.
732~ 182 S.E. 447 ( 19' 5); Hrobla.k i/. i'..-le!ro politan Life In.sUfd.nce
Companyf 79 N.E. 2d 360 (Ohio App., 1947); Hanaieff v. Equitable
Life Assurance- Soc., 71 Pa. S60, 92 A.2d 202 (1952); Best v. Equitable
Life AiJtJra.nce Soc./' 16) Pa. Super. 452;o 68 A.2d 400 ( 1949), aff'd.
36S Pa. 41St 76 A.2d 220 ( 1950); McFadden v. Equitdb!e Life Assurance Soc., 3) 1 Pa. "5 70J 41 A. 2d 62 4 ( 194 S); Miller v. Tra.velel s
ln!ura.nce Com pa.ny! supra; ln.rttfdtJCt Compd'lt)' v. Jacksonj 12 Tenn.
App. 305 ( 1931).
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furnished to the insurance company. The employee adduced

evid encc that he had furnished such proof to Southern Pacific
and that it had denied his claim. On the basis of this undisputed
evidence, tht· trial court instructed the jury that Metropolitan
has V!tr ai ved due proof of claim. This court reversed, hoi ding
at 62 P~2d 1121:
"This letter of ]\.larch 3, 1931, from the Southern
Pacme Company to RaJ ston ~ containing a denial of
liability, did not bind the insurance company. The
Southern Pacific Company ~~as not the agent of the
defendant for that purpose. The courfs instruction
directing the jury that due proof of plain tiff~ s dis~
ability was ~yaived on March 3~ 19 3 1 t was error.~~
Both .concurring opinions expressly voiced agreement with

this vie~v~ Mr. Justice follandts at 62 P.2d 1124 and Mr. Justice
Wolfe's at 62 P.2d 1125. The decision is in accord with the

Korth Carolina case of Dewease v. Trareler s Insurance CornpanJ~ 5upra.

AppeHants are unable to read into Bucher L
Equitable Life AssuraNce Soc, 91 Utah 179~ 63 P.2d 604
( 1936), cited by appellant (App. BrL~ p. 1)) ~ an overruling
by this court of the principle recognized in Ralston which
had been decided ten days previously. Bucher did not involve
the relationship betv"·een employee and employer) but) rather,
the attempt by an insurer to set up a defense based upon a
provision not in the ma5ter policy.
lnastn uch as the employer acts as agent of the employee,
not of the insurer, service of process upon the employer does

not constitute service upon the insurer, Connecticut Gc11eral
Life l;Hurance Company l ... Speer~ supra; Blaylock l'. Pr!tdential
/n.l"urdJh'e C(nJJ pan_r, supra. Nor can the employer bind the
18
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insurer by accepting p rem iu1ns subsequent to the cancellation

of the master policy~ Lancaster
t~tn y~

l'.

Travelerj s Insurance Con1~

supra.

By like token, the rules of the la.v.... of agency apply to the
relationship behveen the employer and employee. The following case is an illustration:
In 1\-le!ropolitan Life Insurance Cotnpany

l ...

11 enr_r,

supra~

\Vas claimed that the employee did not have notice of the
tnaximum time in which proof of claim might be made. The
Indiana Supreme Court rejected the respondent~ s position,
noting: ( 1) it 'vas undisputed that the master policy at all
times pe rtin en t \Vas in the physical posse.s.~ion of the em p1oyer;
(2) under Indiana Jaw~ knowledge of the terms of a policy
by its possessor is conclusive1y pres uine?; and ( 3) the know 1
edge of the employer-agent was imputed, as a matter of law,
to tbe emp1oyee~principa1. The rule of the H ent)' case was
applied by the Indiana AppelJate Court in lrtorales v. Equitable
jt

w

Life

AJSUfance Soc~, supra, which involved the employee's

claimed 1ack of knowledge of a tern porary lay -off provision.

In Mason·\ Adrn'x r. Prudential Insurance Coutpan_r~
supra, the employee (for whom his administratrix was substi~
tuted follo,ving his death) sought to recover from the insurer
disability benefits under a group policy. The in surer de£ ended
on the ground that the policy h.as been cancelled by .it and the
employer. The Kentucky Supre1ne Court held that the ern pJoyer ~

in procuring the policy, acted for the benefit of its employees,
•
including Mason. It stated at 164 S.W. 2d 388-9:
"Such agency was ratified by application for coverage
under the poltcy and the contract completed on a.ccept-
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a nee of the cet tifi catc under the po1icy. Therefore the
railroad company's act in cancelling the policy was
the act of the ins uted+' ~
T h c relationship bet'v een decedent an J Western relative
to the group policy in question was that of agent and principaL
Through the card (Ex. D-1) by 'J··hich decedent accepted the
policy of group insurance he express! y authorized Western
to act in his behalf in deducting premiums from his ~·ages.

By the communication dated June 4, 1957~ decedent instructed
Western as follows : I v.-~ish to drop the ·life ins urancc pat t
of my policy if possible~ Thank you.'· Western~ in reliance
thereon (it is not con tended by a ppe1tan t that Western'~
actions ~vere f ra udu lent) ceased to 1n ake Ji fc insurance Jed uc·
tions and informed Connecticut that decedent's insurance had
been term ina ted (Ex. D-1 0, 11) ~ D eced en t, consequently
4.'

j

appellant, \Vas bound by such notification.

v
UNDER APPLICABLE RULES AS TO COMMUNICA-

TIONS BETWEEN AGENT AND PRINClP AL, DECEDENT~S

COVERAGE \X' AS TERMINATED.

Appellant confuses the more exacting tests courts have

applied to the caneella tion of non· group insu ranee policies
\\:ith the instant case, which involves an instruction from
pr inci pa 1 to agent~

Respondent contends that the communication dated June
• 4j 1957, is clear and unan1biguous under any reasonable interPretation. But giving a ppe llan t every benefit and conceding
arguendo that the communication ~·] wish to drop the ·life
20
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insurance~ part

of my policy if possible. ~'Thank you ts
subject to being construed as a mere inquiry, it surely cannot
be con tended that it is un reasonable to cons true this as a
request to drop decedent from the group coverage. At most,
appellant contends that the comm u o ication in question is
ambiguous+ Granting this premise~ it is reasonably susceptible
to the interpretation placed upon it by Western~
In such event, it is clearly established that neither respond-

ent is liabLe to appellant. Mecham on Agency (2d Ed.) § 1266
states:
the pr incipa 1 desires his instructions to be
pursued! it is obviously necessary that he should make
them intelligible and clear. If how ever they arc so
ambiguous as to be fairly capable of two interpretations and the agent in good faith and with due diligence adopts one of them~ he cannot be held liable
to the principal for a loss that may result on the lattees
-claim that he meant the other~''
~ t If

This vie~r is adopted by the Restatement of Agency 2d,

§ 26:

allthority to do an act can be created by
written or spoken words or other conduct of the prinn

~

,

T

cipal v,; hich~ reasonably interpreted, causes the agent
to believe that the principal desires him. so to act on
the principars accounL"

This rephrases the rule that a document is to· be construed

most strongly against its drafter, Restatenu:nt
§ 235(d)+
Indeed~ the request to

of

Contractsf

drop decedent from group coverage

is put to no more exacting tests as to interpretation than the
21
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original request by d eced en t to make the deductions, which
automatically placed him within the covered group.
Jr is elementary that the principaJ is bound

by the proper

act of h.ls agent, LinJeed Oil Cotn pan;: t Montagio and Smith;
65 IOVII'a 67') 21 N.\X'. 184 ( 1884); Fa/skin 1), r~alls City State
BankJ 71 Neb. 29~ 98 1\J.W. 425 ( 1904); Picket v. Parsons,
l 7 Vt. 4 70 ( 184 5) .
1

•

lnastnuch as Western} decedenfs agent, acted properly

in relying on decedent's communication of his payroll deduction
order, decedent's group 1ife coverage was terminated~

Vl
THERE WAS NO JURY QUES1riON.
Appellant contends that as the communication of June 4,
1957 (Ex. -D-7) \vas nsufficiently ambiguous·~ appellant should
have been able to submit the matter to a jury ( App. Brf. p~ 19).

It is submitted that appellant confuses the function of
judge and jury in this case. By definition the word ~·ambiguous'"'
means capable of being understood in either of t\VO or more
possible senses~'~ W ebsters New International DictionarJ~
Unabridged, 2d Ed_ By appelJant's very statement (which
re5pondent does not concede) as the statement \VaS t~ambigu
ous~~ it was one on V~t~hich two reasonable people could disagree.
Thus) even if \'X? estern placed .a different meaning on the
communication rhan \\·hat was intended~ as it ~vas concededly
ambiguous, Western's condtiCt \\'a~ concededly reasonable. As
a jury is only entitled to pass upon rna tte rs concerning ~rh ich
reasonable men can disagree) and as by appellant's own postu4

t
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lation the action of Western was reasonable~ there is no jury

question.

e

Moreover, the tria I co U! s ruling it consistent with the

well-established general rule that the interpretation, construction, meaning and legal effect of written instruments are
matters of law for the court. As Mr. Justice Brandeis states:
t, The construction
and effect of a written instrument is a
question of law.~~ Su·ift and Companyv~ Hocking Valley R. Co.,
243 U. S. 281~ 37 S. Ct. 287, 61 L. Ed. 722 at 725 ( 1917).
The Eighth Circuit) in denying defendant's claim that the
meaning of the \Vritten language in question should have
been left to the jury~ quoted 'vith approval the foil owing
general rule:
(~Undoubtedly,

the general rule is that the question
whether written instruments constitute a contract, as
well as the interpretation of such written instruments
when it is determined that they do constitute a contract~ belongs to the court, and not to the jury.~' Drain~
age DiJtrict No~ 1 v. Rude~ 21 Fr2d 257 (8 Cir., 1927).
See Digest, Key No. Co~ tracts, 176.
Utah law recognizes this rule. Thus § 78-21~3 UCA 1953
~!All

q ues tio n s of 1ali;V including . . . the construction of statutes and other wt<itin gs . . . are to be decided
by the court and . all discus s.ions of Ia w addressed to it.~) As
this court has stated, in holding that the trial court erred in
submitting a question of the meaning and construction of a
written document to the. jury that ~ tThe legal effect of written
requires that

instruments is necessarily a question of law, and hence is one
that must be determined by the court. To that rule there is
no exception ... :>, Verdi v. fl elpet' Stale Bank, 57 Utah 502,
196 P. 225 at 228, 15 A.L.R~ 641 ( 1921) ~
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Appellant claims no oral or written communication to
~'estern

supplemental to decedent's writing of June 4l 1957.
Appellant admits this communication was the rt on/y communication~t (App. Brf. p. 15) What he said to his wife about
this is in admissable and irrelevant. The legal effect of the
communication must be found from its four corners. As this
court has very recently held) a pc rson 5 undisclosed intention
can not vary the Ian guage of a written instrument~ Clyde t·.
Eddington Cannery Co. 1 ---· L"tah --.. , 347 P.2d 563 ( 1959) This
job the trial court quite pro per l y assumed.
+

t

7

The trial court extensively reviewed the case and the

facts with counsel. .A. ppellant has £ailed to show any specific
facts~ other than the interpretation of the 'vrltlng of June 4,
1957, which she contends would have gone to a jury. Indeed
there are non e.
Our rules are designed for the most expeditious disposition
of 1i tigation As this court quite recently pointed out ~ tT he
letter and spirit of our rules are tdesigned toward effectuating
an lnexpensi-ve and ex: peditious d eterm ina tion of li ti ga tion. ~
+

j

Aetna Loan Company v. Fidelity

Deposit Company
land: ____ Utah 7---~ 346 P~2d 1078 ( 19 59)
&

t

of i\Luy-

7

VII

COJVIMUNICATION OF JUNE 4, 1957~
CLEARLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY EXPRESSED HIS INTENTION TO DROP HIS LIFE COVERAGE.
DECEDENT~S

Despite the fact that, as pointed out above., a communication from employee to employer is not bound by the standards
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as to clarity which courts have set forth as to reguests for
cancel! ation rna de from an insured to an insurer, it is submitted
that the communication in question meet5 even these tests
and is reasonably capable of no other interpretation.
The policy provides for termination of coverage ~~if any
employee cancels his einployee deduction order (Ex. D-9).
There was no particular form prescribed for effecting such
caneella tion and under genera 1 rules of insurance 1aw ~ no
particular form of notice of request 1s requisite~' ( 45 C~ J.S.
Insurance~ § 458, p~ 117. Even where the use of a particular
form appears in any policy it is inserted" clearly for the convenience of the in~uranc e company and tan be waived by it
by accepting such requests in other ~T a ys. This has even been
held to be the case where the insurance company did not in
1

j

t

fact treat such a request on an unauthorized fo rrn as a can~
.cellation~

In a recent Virginia case, the insured wrote to the

company ... Please cancel my Policy # 34230-NS-46 as of today.

Please return my earned premiwn~ I am getting rid of my
car and will not need insurance. T·hanking you for your cooperation.~' The company replied that ·the request had been
referred to its ag~t. The agent titled out a form, nPolicy
Ho1der ~ s Re9ues t for Cancellation, and mailed it to the
insured who never 5j gned it. Nevertheless~ the court bel d that
the insured~ s letter affected cancellation~ Stttte fat'm .l\Jutual
Anto Insurance Co. v. Pedersonj 185 Va. 941, 11 S.E. 2d 64
( 1947). The receipt of such a request effectively terminates
in sur a nee without any further action by the insurance company. Where an insured ~Trote requesting cancelJation on
March 1, had a fire loss on the 13th, and the insurance company wrote notifying the insured that the policy had been
j'
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cancelled as of March 17~ the court nevertheless held that
the po !icy had been e£f ectivel y terminated as of the 1st. The
court held that the t eques t ipso fat" I o operated to terminate
the contract. Atlantic Fire Insurance Co. of R.aleigfJJ 1'-lorth
G'afollna v.

SrnithJ 183 Okla.

97~ SO P.2d 216 ( 1938).

AppeiJant cites S~tJkatchen·,ln

0 ffire

Government lnJufance

Padget; 245 F+2d 48 (S Grr, 1957) . The case is of
no assistance to u.s~ as that court points out that ~.There is no
provision in the policy issued by Saskatchewan which permits
cancellation by or on behalf of Padget [the insured] .. , Nor
is this court aided in this case by decisions turning on intert\

pretations of lengthy communications,

construed .ln

their

entirety, [e.g-~ Phillips v. Hir;chi~ 92 Mich ~693~ 201 N+W.
1.96 ( 1942)]. The conununication before this court is the
epitome of brevity~
Appellant strains to torture the communication as a mere

request for information. This is done by emphasizing the use
of the words !twishH and if possiblen. The use of other
decisions is only of limited value because the statement must
be construed in its own contexL Thus the words ~ . if possible'~
and the context of the communication .at most condition the
request on the objective fact of the possibiii ty o £ Western's
being able to do the required act. Objectively. it \\'as possible
to drop the Iife insu ranee coverage, and thus the objective
4

1-

condition was met) and Western acted within tb is possibi 1i ty.
There are no other conditions set forth in the note.

As to the word nwisht' one need go no further th.an the
dictionary to sustain tb e tria 1 court s interpretation. Thus
1

1

'wish'' is defined as meaning inter alia

~~to

request; command''.
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The noun is defined as ~ . ex press ion of d esj re; request petition+'·
Webster~s New International Dictionary, Unabridged, 2d Ed~

Going no further than appellanfs own cited source we find
the statement nwish to cancerj as used in a letter stating that
the writers ~·wish to cancel'· a certain con tract, ~ ~ imports nothing in the nature of a request for consent or deference to the
views of the other party. It announces, though in civil phrase.,
the intention of the writer to ex c rcise his right reserved to
him.~. n, Ireland vi> DickJ 130 Pa. 299) 18 A . 735, 736 (1889);
45 Words and Phrases, p. 361+

In Gately·Haire Co. v. Niagara

221 N.Y. 162, 116 N.E. 1015 ( 1917); the insured wrote the
company~ '[·on taking our inventory, we .find we are carrying
more insurance than is nee essary. We wish to cancel Policy
1\,.o. 15 ~ 99 7
This cancellation to take e.ff ect at once.
Please give this matter your immediate attention and oblige.~'
The insured subsequently a·rgued, as ap pe llan t does here, that
the word ~wisht! indicated that the letter was mereJy the
expression of a hope, rather than a request. The court disagreed
and held that the policy had been cancelled.
+

I

}'ire Insufance Company,

•

•

+

4

One need only consider that this ""·as the communication
betw'een an employee to his superior to understand that the
decedent would naturally wish to preserve the normal amenities
of poll te correspondence. Surely it waul d have been most
unusual for a newly-hired employee to couch such a request
in words, for example~ ~'I demand my life insurance cove rage
be dropped forthwith!'~ Courtesy certainly is not so exceptional
that we should atlow its day-to-day use to alter the clear
meaning of business communication.
27
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Moreover~ assuming that the

as to

~rbether

decedent was in any doubt

his request had been acted upon, he need only

have observed that his ins ur a nee deductions a£ ter the end
of the payrperiod following the submission of his reguestJ
reflected a deduction of $1.8 0 1ess than previousLy. The $1.80
tv as the amount shoVtrn as that portion of the life ins uranee

pre1nium which em ploye-ts v..·ere to pay in the brochure which
appellant admits decedent received. Whi Ie as observed above
confirmation by the insurance company of a request to cancel

is unnecessary~ the request operating ipsu facto to affect thjs]
it is clear, as the tria i court pointed out, that decedent was
advised of this in any event.

CONCLUSION
The instant case raises the issue as to whether deced cnt

\vas included 'vithin the life insurance portion of his employee's
group insurance po hey at the time of his death. The em pJoyer
is not liable in any event. Decedent was not included at the
time of his death beeause of a prior \v ri tten communication
from him to his em player, acting as his principal~ \v hich could
reasonably be construed as a request to drop this coverage,
the employer did drop decedent from this coverage and ceased

[() withhold that portion of the premium chargeable to the
employee for life insurance. Moreover~ even if the conununica tion from decedent were ca. te gorized as a !e<j,u est from the
insured to his insurer to cancel a policy~ \~· hich respondent
contends it is notj the communication clearly and unequivocally
expressed decedent· s intention to drop his coverage and such
28
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coverage was terminated upon the pay-period following its
receipt Thus, respondent respectfully urges that the decision
of the tria 1 court be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
Albert J. Col ton
Kent Shearer

Attot<neys jot" Respondents
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